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Abstract  A dynamic Cournot game model is used to predict the strategic behavior of 
harvesters engaged in a non-cooperative fishery on a common property resource.    The model 
predicts that an increase in the current number of harvesters in a common property fishery 
will reduce both the equilibrium harvest level and the current resource rent for the individual 
harvester.  Also, an increase in the future number of harvesters increases both two 
equilibrium levels.  These predictions are tested using data from the Japanese skipjack 
fishery in the Western-central Pacific Ocean.  The empirical results on the effect of changes 
in the current and future numbers of harvesters on the individual harvest rates and resource 
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  One of the fundamental insights gained from the analysis of common property 
resources is that these resources will tend to be over-harvested.  The degree of this 
over-harvesting depends on the number of harvesters.  In the case where open access is 
assumed, over-harvesting results in all rents from resource harvest being dissipated.  With a 
limited number of harvesters, rents are not generally fully dissipated.  When resource rents 
are not fully dissipated, harvesters have a motive for caring about future conditions.  
Lowering harvest in the present will increase stock levels and resource rents available in the 
future.  In contrast, open-access harvesters have no incentive to behave other than 
myopically, as they cannot capture future (or present) rents. 
In this paper, I develop a simple model of a common property fishery as a dynamic 
game with an arbitrary number of harvesters.  Harvesters are assumed to simultaneously 
choose harvest levels within a period.  Between periods the fish stock grows according to a 
deterministic growth function.  I solve the model for subgame perfect equilibrium.  I use 
the model to develop predictions about the how the number of present and future harvesters 
affects equilibrium.    Specifically, I show that an increase in the current number of harvesters 
reduces both the current individual harvest and current resource rent.    On the other hand, an 
increase in the future number of harvesters, ceteris paribus, increases the individual harvest 
and the current resource rent.    With open-access, however, a change in future conditions has 
no effect on current equilibrium values, as there is no dynamic link in behavior. 
The predictions of the model are tested empirically using data on the skipjack fisheries 
in the Western-central Pacific Ocean (WCPO).  The WCPO includes a high sea and the 
numbers of islands country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  The skipjack and tuna stock 
(highly migratory fish stock) in the WCPO has been harvested by numbers of distant-water 
fishing (DWF) countries, Japan, USA, South Korea, Taiwan, and Russia, and by numbers of 
coastal states, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Philippine, and Solomon, since the early 
1980's.  Most countries have gradually increased their numbers of boats and total harvest of 
skipjack and tuna from the WCPO.  I obtained information on the total number of vessels 
operating from all countries in this fishery between 1969 and 1999.  In addition, from the 
Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery I obtained detailed information on 
costs incurred and the revenues earned by the Japanese skipjack fishery fleet operating in this 
skipjack pole and line fishery between 1972 and 1998. 
I tested the predictions of the model using two equations for the current individual 
equilibrium harvests and individual current profit (resource rent).  These equations include 
the current and future number of harvesters as explanatory variables.    The parameters for the 
two equations are estimated by using equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS).  
The most estimated parameters for the current and future number of harvesters are of the 
expected sign in two equations.   There have been a number of prior game-theoretic models of a harvesting from a 
common-property resource.  Levhari and Mirman (1980) first developed a model in which 
they solved for feedback dynamic equilibria in Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly models.  
The closest model to one the considered in this paper is Negri (1990).  Negri (1990) 
analyzed a dynamic Cournot model with n harvesters where average and marginal harvest 
cost increases with the ratio of harvest to stock.    He solves for a subgame perfect equilibrium 
in an infinite-horizon model with different numbers of harvesters.   He shows that with open 
access, the equilibrium leads to complete rent dissipation. 
Another theory that could be used to explain the dynamics present in a common 
property resource was developed and analyzed by Smith (1968).  Smith (1968) assumed 
competitive harvesters that ignored the effect that their individual actions had on the resource 
stock and price.    Further, he assumed that the rate of entry (exit) was proportional to the rate 
of profit (loss).  Smith’s model can generate similar dynamics in a common property 
resource to game-theoretic models.  One difference, however, is that since harvesters in 
Smith’s model are static optimizers, the number of future harvesters should not affect current 
equilibrium values. 
While there are a number of theoretical models of harvesting a common property 
resources, there are a few empirical work for a common property resources (e.g., Paterson and 
Wilen, 1977; Henderson and Tugwell, 1979; Carlos and Lewis, 1993; Missios and Plourde, 
1996).    These studies, however, analyzed strategic behavior in fisheries without testing game 
theoretic predictions by econometric technique.  Previous empirical work testing game 
theoretic predictions for resource models have focused on non-common property 
nonrenewable resources (e.g., Griffin, 1985; Dahl and Yucel, 1991; Polasky, 1992). 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the background of the 
international and Japanese skipjack and tuna fisheries in the WCPO.    Section 3 provides the 
two propositions for the strategic behavior of the common property harvesters by using the 
Cournot dynamic oligopoly model of Negri.  Section 4 presents empirical models and 
estimation techniques.  Section 5 explains the data used in this study.  In section 6, the 
results are reported.    The final section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  Background 
 
  According to the Japanese division of water area, the Western-central Pacific Ocean 
(WCPO) is located at the area between 20°N latitude and 10°S latitude, and between 130°E 
longitude and 180°W longitude (see Figure 1).  The WCPO includes a high sea and the 
numbers of coastal states' (including many island countries) exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  
The coastal state countries in the WCPO, Australia, New Zealand, and island countries (Fiji, 
Kiribati, Federated State of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Niue, Solomon Island, and Tubaru) organized the South Pacific Forum of Fisheries Agency (FFA) in 1979.  The 
WCPO overlaps the FFA water area, in the area between 20°N latitude and 25°S latitude, and 
between 130°E longitude and 150°W longitude (see Figure 1). 
  The WCPO is the most valuable fishing ground of skipjack and tuna (yellowfin tuna 
and big eye) for Japanese distant-water fishing (DWF).    The skipjack and tuna stocks (highly 
migratory fish stock) in the WCPO were harvested by only Japanese DWF vessels until 1980.   
After that, many countries entered into this fishery and gradually increased their number of 
vessels and total harvest of skipjack and tuna from the WCPO.  These fish stocks are 
generally harvested by using purse seine (purse seine fishery).  However, part of the tuna 
stock is harvested by using long-line and part of the skipjack stock is harvested by using pole 
and line. 
  Table 1 shows the numbers of operated vessels (purse seiners) by countries during 
1969 through 1999.  Japanese purse seiners started to increase the number of vessels since 
1974 and maintained around 35 vessels after 1982.  This is because Japanese distant-water 
purse seiners operate under fishing licenses issued by the Japanese government which restricts 
the number of purse seiners, the size of fishing vessels, and the operating area.    The Japanese 
government could not increase the number of purse seiners because they have to balance 
between the fish landing from the distant-water and from the Japanese coast.     
There are also some other DWF countries operating in the WCPO.    The US entered 
in the WCPO in 1976, and gradually increased the numbers of vessels and reached a peak of 
62 vessels in 1983.    South Korea and Taiwan started the purse seine fishery in the WCPO in 
1980 and 1983, respectively.  Their numbers of operated vessels also increased and reached 
a peak of 39 vessels in 1990 and 45 vessels in 1992, respectively.  Other DWF countries, 
Russia and New Zealand (which is the one of FFA members, but the WCPO water area is far 
from the New Zealand) entered in the WCPO in 1985 and in 1975 (although the data is 
missing until 1983), respectively.  Mexico once entered the purse seine fishery in 1984, but 
left in 1986.    Spain entered the purse seine fishery in 1999. 
  A number of coastal states also entered into the WCPO for the purse seine fishery.  
Those countries include the Philippines, Solomon Island, Federal State of Micronesia, Papua 
New Guinea, Vanuatu, Australia, Indonesia, and Kiribati, which are mostly members of FFA.   
The numbers of vessels for those coastal countries are much smaller than the ones of DWF 
countries (number of one figure). 
  With the emergence of many new countries, the total number of vessels in the WCPO 
is obviously growing.    The total number of vessels started with only 4 in 1969 and gradually 
increased to 69 in 1982.  The next year, the number doubled (120 vessels).  The number 
gradually increased and reached a peak of 197 in 1992.  Since then, the number of vessels 
has remained fairly constant at around 190.  Although there is an international organization 
such as FFA, the FFA is only for the coastal countries in the South Pacific Ocean.    The FFA 
recently tried to control the fishery in WCPO without DWF countries, but Japan and South Korea, the DWF countries, opposed it and asserted that international organization managing 
the fishery in the WCPO should include, not only coastal countries, but also DWF countries.  
Hence, there is no international agreement for the management of the number of vessels in the 




3.    Dynamic Cournot Equilibrium Harvest of a Common Property Resource 
 
  In this section, I define a two-period model of harvest by an arbitrary number of 
harvesters from a common property resource.  The model is similar to that of Negri (1990) 
in that within a period harvesters act like Cournot competitors, simultaneously choosing 
harvest levels, and between periods the resource stock evolves according to a deterministic 
growth function.  Unlike Negri (1990), a different number of harvesters in different periods 
is allowed.  The model is solved for a subgame perfect equilibrium.  I derive testable 
predictions about non-cooperative equilibrium in a common property resource such as the 
skipjack and tuna fishery in the WCPO. 
 
3.  1  The  model 
  Suppose there are nt harvesters of the common property resource, denoted i = 1, 2,⋅⋅⋅ , 
nt, for t = 1, 2.    In the beginning of each period, the harvesters face a resource stock  St . The 
initial resource stock, S1, is given.  The nt harvesters simultaneously choose harvest level in 
period t.  Let ht









be total harvest in period t.  The total harvest is non-negative and cannot exceed 
the resource stock (0 ≤  Ht ≤  St).    The resource stock evolves from period to period according 
to  Sg S H tt t + =− 1 ( ),where g(.) is a deterministic concave growth function.       
  Further, the unit cost of harvesting fish is assumed to increase with the ratio of 
harvest to stock.  Typically as the stock level falls, it becomes more difficult to harvest fish 
and unit harvest costs should increase.    The cost of harvesting fish,Ct
j, can be written for the 








i =α ;      i = 1, 2,···, n;  t = 1, 2,  (1) 
where α  is a cost parameter (α  > 0). 
  The profit earned by each harvester i from the fishery in period t,  π t
i , is the 
difference between the revenue and the cost in each period.  The unit price of the harvested 
fish is assumed to be constant at P ( i.e., perfectly elastic demand because there are many substitutes in the world market) with 0 < P < 2.
1  The profits earned in period t by the n 
harvesters are 














 ;      i = 1, 2,···, n;  t = 1, 2.  (2) 
All  n harvesters are assumed to have complete information, that is, the payoff functions 
(profits) are common knowledge. 
  To solve the two-period Cournot model for a subgame perfect equilibrium, 
backwards induction is used and begins in period 2 (i.e., the last period of the game).    When 
period 2 is reached, the n harvesters face the following profit maximization problem: 
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 α ;      i = 1, 2,···, n. (3) 
  The first order condition of (3) is set equal to zero to find a typical harvester’s best 
response function.
2  The n identical first-order conditions are summed and solved for the 




















;      i = 1, 2,···, n. (5) 
This equation shows the subgame perfect equilibrium for each harvester in period 2.   It is a 
feedback (subgame perfect) solution and a function of the state of the system in period 2 (i.e., 
S2). 
                                                 
1 To get an interior solution for the subgame perfect equilibrium in this model, the size of P has to be: 
 0  <  P < 2α . 
This is because if P is greater than or equal to 2α , all harvesters will harvest all stock in the first stage and the 
game will be over. 
2  The second-order conditions are satisfied for a maximum in both period 1 and 2.  In both cases, the 













t h S ()
=− < ;     t = 1, 2. 
There is a unique (stable) equilibrium in both period 1 and 2, as in the standard Cournot model with linear 
demand and constant returns to scale, because the absolute value of the second derivative of a firm’s profit 
function with respect to its own harvest is greater than the absolute value of the second derivative of the firm’s 
profit function with respect to rivals’ harvests (Tirole, pp. 226).   Substituting the subgame perfect equilibrium in (5) and the aggregated equilibrium 
harvest of all harvesters in (4) into the objective function in (3), the one-period optimal value 















;      i = 1, 2,···, n. (6) 
  Given the second period solutions, the problem for each harvester in period 1 can be 
derived: 
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 + αβ ;      i = 1, 2,···, n, (7) 
where β  is the discount factor (0 < β  <1).    Substituting the one-period optimal value function 
in (6) and the stock growth equation into equation (7), the optimization problem for the each 
harvester can be rewritten as 






























;      i = 1, 2,···, n. (8) 
where the size of fish stock in period 1, S1, is given exogenously.    The best response function 
for each of the n harvesters is found and summed over the n first-order conditions to find the 
profit maximizing harvest level for the harvesters in period 1.    The equilibrium harvest level 


















































;      i = 1, 2,···, n. (10) 
This is the subgame perfect equilibrium for the n harvesters in period 1. 
  Using the objective function in (8), the two-period optimal value function for each 
harvester is found by substituting in the subgame perfect equilibrium harvest levels of the 

























































 i  = 1, 2,···, n. (11) 
Note that the subgame perfect equilibria in (9), (10), and (11) can be solved for an infinite-period horizon (steady state).
3  However, the comparative statics cannot be used for 
the steady state equilibria because they include a very complex square term.  Hence, only a 
two-period Cournot model is used in this paper. 
  For the empirical analysis, however, the two-period optimal value cannot be 
observed; hence, the first-period profit level (π 1
i*), which is observable, is used as a proxy of 
the two-period optimal value (V
i
1
*).  Substituting the equilibrium harvest level for the 
collective harvesters in (9) and for the individual harvester in (10) into the first term in the 
objective function in (8), the first-period equilibrium profit level,  π 1
i*, is 

















































  The solutions given in (10) and (12) allow one to prove several testable implications 
for the WCPO fisheries.  Partial derivatives of the equilibrium harvest levels for the 
individual harvester and the individual equilibrium profit (resource rent) with respect to the 

















These results lead to the following proposition (see the Appendix A for proofs of the 
propositions). 
 
Proposition 1:  An increase in the number of harvesters in a common property fishery 
increases reduces both the equilibrium harvest and profit (resource rent) level for the 
individual harvester. 
 
  Entry affects fishing cost through both dynamic stock and static crowding 
externalities.  The dynamic stock externality decreases user cost by reducing stock size in 
the second period, conversely, the static crowding externality increases the harvesting cost in 
                                                 
3  The steady state solutions for the collective and individual equilibrium harvest, and individual optimal value 
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  ω  =  () () () () [] () () [] nP n nP r n r
2 2 22 2 2 4 2 2
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −+ + + − + + + − + βα β β α β . each period.  In total, the net harvesting costs increase, which reduces the harvest levels of 
the individual harvester.  Entry and the corresponding externalities, therefore, reduce the 
resource rent for all harvesters by reducing profits in both periods. 
  Comparative statics show other implications for the fishery in the WCPO.  The 
partial derivatives of the equilibrium harvest level for the individual harvester, and the 
individual equilibrium profit with respect to parameter P, α , β  and S are, respectively (see the 



























































The discount factor can be written as β  = 1/(1+δ ), where δ  is the periodic discount rate.  
















3. 2    The extended model for variable number of harvesters 
  Up to now, the number of harvesters (n) is assumed to be fixed in both period 1 and 
2.    However, the expectation of the next period n might affect the three equilibrium levels in 
the current period.    So the extension is that the number of harvesters (n) is allowed to change 
between the two periods in the basic model (the other parameters remain fixed between the 
two periods).    Let n1 and n2 denote the number of harvesters in period 1 and 2, respectively.   
If the number of harvesters (n) is allowed to change between the two periods; the three 



















































































































. (15)   Using the alternative equilibrium solutions in (14) and (15), the partial derivatives of 
the equilibrium harvest levels for the individual harvester, and the equilibrium profit level for 










































These results can be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2:   If the number of harvesters changes between the current and next period, an 
increase in the number of harvesters in the current period reduces both the equilibrium 
harvest and profit (resource rent) level for the individual harvester.  On the other hand, an 
increase in the number of harvesters in the next period, which is the future expectation of the 
number of harvesters, increases all three equilibrium levels. 
 
  While the effects of the current entry on the equilibrium levels are the same as the 
ones by the original case in proposition 1, the effects of the expected future entry are different 
from the original results.  The individual harvesters increase both the equilibrium harvest 
and profit level if they expect the future entry will increase, given fixed current harvesters.  
There is no dynamic stock externality since the current number of harvesters does not change, 
but, the static crowding externality increases the harvesting cost only in the second period, 
which decreases user cost.  As a result, the reduced user cost, which implies the reservation 
of the stock is less valuable, causes a higher equilibrium harvest level.    Further, the increase 
in the harvest level results in a greater first-period profit without static crowding externality in 
the first period. 
 
 
4.  The  Empirical  Model 
 
  The econometric equations to be estimated are based on two equilibrium equations in 
the previous section:  the individual equilibrium harvest (h) in equation (10) and the 
first-period equilibrium profit for each harvester (π ) in equation (12).    These two equilibrium 
levels (dependent variables) are identified as a function of five independent variables: the 
number of harvesters (fishing vessels) (n); the price of the skipjack harvested (P); the cost 
parameter (α ); the discount rate (δ ); and the fish stock (S). 
  For empirical analysis, the cost parameter (α ) is provided by average (total) cost (i.e., 
unit cost of harvest), which is the total cost divided by the total harvest (hereafter, the cost parameter (α ) is called average cost).    The average total cost includes average fixed cost, for 
which the depreciation of vessel, building, and equipment is used.  Note that catch per unit 
effort (CPUE) is used as a proxy of skipjack and tuna stock level (S) in the WCPO, because 
there are no reliable data for the skipjack and tuna stock in the WCPO.    This is based on the 
assumption (i.e., the catch-per-unit-effort hypothesis or the Schaefer hypothesis) that CPUE is 
proportional to the current stock size (Clark, 1990).
4 
  There might be, however, two problems with these explanatory variables.    First, it is 
merely an hypothesis that the CPUE is a linear function of the fish stock.    If it is not a linear 
but rather a nonlinear function, then the CPUE hypothesis results in a specification error due 
to omitting a relevant explanatory variables (e.g., the omission of the square term of the fish 
stock).    Hence, the OLS estimator of the coefficients will be biased and inconsistent, and the 
OLS estimator of the variance of the coefficients will contain an upward bias.  Second, 
inclusion of both the average cost and the CPUE causes a multicollinearity problem because 
the CPUE is likely to be highly correlated with the unit variable cost.  One of the remedies 
for this problem is to drop either one of explanatory variables from the model. 
  In general form, the above two equilibrium levels at time t can be written as a 
function of n, P, α , δ , and S: 
  hh n P S t tt ttt = (,,,,) αδ  and  (16a) 
  ππ α δ tt t t t t nP S = ( , , , , ). (16b) 
If proposition 1 in Section 3 is correct, then: 
 i)    hn() ⋅< 0 and 
 ii)    π n() ⋅< 0, 
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives with respect to n.  On the other hand, if 
proposition 2 in Section 3 is true, then: 
 iii)    hn1 0 () ⋅< ,   hn2 0 () ⋅>  and 
 iv)    π n1 0 () ⋅< ,   π n2 0 () ⋅> ; 
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives with respect to n1 and n2 (i.e., n is divided into 
two terms: n1 and n2). 
  Figure 2 shows the relationship between two equilibrium levels (ht and π t) and the 
number of harvesters (nt) for a given level of other right-hand-side explanatory variables: P = 
                                                 
4  The Schaefer hypothesis is expressed as H = qES, where H, q, E, and S denotes the catch rate, the catchability 




qS = , 
which is a linear function of the fish stock level. 1, α  = 1, β  = 0.9, r = 0.5, and S = 1.  These relationships can be approximated by using an 
exponential function 
5, so that the following exponential function is used as an approximation 
for the general model: 
  hn u th t h t =⋅⋅ λ
γ 1
,  and  (17a) 
  πλ π
θ
π tt t nu =⋅⋅
1
, , (17b) 
where  u’s are disturbance terms at time t, which is added because of random errors in 
optimization, and λ h  = eP S tt t t
γγγ γγ αδ
023 4 5  and λ π  = eP S tt t t
θθθ θθ αδ
023 4 5 .  It is assumed 
that errors (u’s) enter multiplicatively because some common unmeasurable or omitted 
variables will create proportionately large errors in large harvest or profit years.  Taking 
natural logs of both sides of equations (17a) and (17b) gives a log-linear specification: 
 
  ln ln ln ln ln ln , hn P S tt t t t t h t = ++++++ γ γ γ γ α γ δ γ ε 01 2 3 4 5  and  (18a) 
  ln ln ln ln ln ln , πθθ θ θαθδθ επ tt t t t t t nP S =+ + + + + + 01 2 3 4 5 , (18b) 
 
where  ε= lnu , and β , γ , and θ are coefficients to be estimated.  The log-linear equation in 
(18b), however, cannot be used for estimation in this paper because the data on individual 
harvester’s profit include some negative values.    Therefore, instead of using log-linear form, 
a semilog specification is used for the first-period profit equation in (18b): 
 
  πθθ θ θαθδθ επ tt t t t t t nP S = ++++++ 01 2 3 4 5 ln ln ln ln ln , , (18c) 









  For the test of proposition 2, another term for the expected number of future 
harvesters,  n
e, is added in the model:  γ6 lnnt
e (18a)  and θ 6 lnnt
e (18c).  For this term, it 
is assumed that the harvesters’ expectation in the next period is a trend of the number of 
harvesters between the previous and current period.  In this paper, the number of harvesters 
in the next period is used for the expected number of future harvesters (n
e). 
  The disturbances at a given time in two equations are likely to reflect some common 
unmeasurable or omitted factors; hence, they could be correlated (i.e., contemporaneous 
correlation).  When this is the case, it may be more efficient to estimate all equations (18a 
and 18c) jointly rather than to estimate by using equation-by-equation ordinary least squares 
                                                 
5  This nonlinear shape is created by the cost function in equation (1). (OLS).  In these two equations, however, the right-hand-side explanatory variables in these 
two equations are identical so that the parameter estimates by SUR estimation are identical 
with that by equation-by equation OLS estimation (there is no efficiency gain).    In this paper, 
therefore, equation-by-equation OLS is used for the estimation. 
  In this econometrics model, there might be a simultaneity problem.  The expected 
number of future harvesters (n
e) and the first-period profit (π ) might be endogenous.  The 
number of future harvesters may depend on the current profit level.  If a simultaneity 
problem exists, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent, so that two stage least squares 
(2SLS) or three stage least squares (3SLS) estimation should be used, if any, with 
instrumental variables.  When samples are extremely small, however, the distributions for 
2SLS and 3SLS estimators are not known to be normal and the mean of the 2SLS estimator 
may not exist.    In addition, in small samples, the OLS estimator (despite their inconsistency) 
has a lower variance than the 2SLS estimator (Judge, et al., 1988, pp. 655).  Therefore, the 
2SLS and 3SLS estimation may not be appropriate methods to use with these data. 
  The theoretical analysis in the previous section tells us a priori the signs of the 
parameters: γ 1 < 0, γ 2 > 0, γ 3 < 0, γ 4 > 0, γ 5 > 0, and γ 6 > 0 for the individual harvest equation 
(h) and θ1 < 0, θ2 > 0, θ3 < 0, θ4 < 0, θ5 > 0, and θ6 > 0 for the first-period profit equation (π ).  
For the purpose of this paper, the main parameters of interest are γ 1, γ 6, θ1, and θ6. 
 
 
5.  Data 
 
  The empirical analysis uses data from the Japanese pole and line fishery, which 
harvested skipjack stock in the WCPO from 1972 to 1998.    These data are used as a proxy of 
purse seine fishery for the skipjack and tuna in the WCPO because the data for the Japanese 
purse seine fishery are not available.  The Japanese government publishes annual economic 
data for many kinds of fisheries in the Investigation Report of Fishery Economics by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (Japan).
6  These data are not for individual 
vessel levels but an average of randomly selected vessels (i.e., group mean data
 7)  The 
observation number is 27 (time series).  In each year, the numbers of randomly selected 
samples (harvesters) are different.  The data are collected by questionnaires and direct 
interviews from randomly selected harvesters.  The data include average vessel weight, 
number of working days and workers, total revenue from the fishery, variable costs (including   
 
                                                 
6  The English titles for the Japanese publications in this section are translated from Japanese by the author. 
7  There are two effects when the group mean date is used.    First, the parameter estimates are less efficient 
because of the loss of information.    Second, the fit of the regression sometime improves greatly.    See Green 
(1990), pp.289-293. labor, fuel, material, repair cost, fees, and other cost), fixed capital cost, capital depreciation 
and wages (for one person a day).   
  For the data on dependent variables, the individual harvest of skipjack (h), which is 
not available, is calculated by dividing the total revenue by the price of the skipjack.  The 
data for the total revenue come from the Investigation Report of Fishery Economics by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (Japan).    The sizes of the pole and line vessels 
are all between 200 to 500 tons with an average of 402 tons between 1972 and 1998.  As a 
proxy of two-period value (V), the individual harvester’s profit (π ) is calculated by subtracting 
total cost (variable cost plus capital depreciation) from total revenue, which comes from the 
Investigation Report of Fishery Economics by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery (Japan). 
  For the data on explanatory variables, the number of harvesters (n) in the WCPO is 
obtained from the Tuna Fishery Yearbook 1999 (see Table 1).  The expected number of 
future harvesters (n
e) is using the number of harvesters (n) in the next year.   In addition, the 
data for the price of the harvested skipjack (P) is obtained from the Annual Statistical Report 
of Fishery Product Market by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (Japan).    The 
discount rate (δ ) used is the 10 year government bond yield to subscribers, which is obtained 
from the Economic Statistics Annual by the Research and Statistics Department, Bank of 
Japan.    The other explanatory variables, cost parameter (α ) and fish stock (S), are substituted 
by using (total) average cost and catch per unit effort, respectively.    The former is derived by 
dividing total cost (variable cost plus capital depreciation) by the individual harvest level (yen 
/ tons) and the latter is calculated by dividing the total skipjack catches by vessel-days, which 




6.  Empirical  Results 
 
  Table 2 presents the estimation results of the regression equations based on the 
individual equilibrium harvest (h) in (18a).  The equilibrium equation is estimated by 
equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS).  There are two specifications: one is for 
proposition 1 and the other is for proposition 2, which is added an expected harvest term.  
The fish stock term (S) is dropped from the equations to be estimated because CPUE has 
extremely small correlation with other variables, which indicates the assumption (CPUE is 
proportional to the current stock size) is not the case in this study.    Estimates of the standard 
errors are shown in parentheses below the estimates of the coefficients.  For t-test of each 
parameter estimate, a one-tailed test is used because the theoretical model in Section 3   
provides all signs of the parameter estimates.  One, Two, and three stars indicate that 
parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
  In the first specification for proposition 1, the estimated coefficients for the number 
of harvesters (n) and the discount rate (δ ) have the unexpected signs.  The other variables, 
the price of skipjack (P) and the average cost (α ), have the expected signs, that are 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  The estimated price elasticity of supply 
is 0.7465 (i.e., inelastic), which is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  The 
adjusted R
2 is high of 0.9564 and the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics is 1.7411. 
  In the second specification for proposition 2, the estimated coefficients for the 
number of harvesters (n), the expected number of harvesters (n
e), and the discount rate (δ ) 
have the unexpected signs.  The other variables, the price of skipjack (P) and the average 
cost (α ), have the expected signs, that are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% 
confidence level, respectively.  The estimated price elasticity of supply is 0.6417 (i.e., 
inelastic), which is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  The adjusted R
2 is 
high of 0.9556 and the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics is 1.7138. 
  Table 3 shows the estimation results on the first-period profit (π ) in (18c) by 
equation-by-equation OLS.    The estimated coefficients of the all variables perfectly have the 
expected signs in both specifications.  In the first specification for proposition 1, the 
estimated coefficients for the number of harvesters (n) are statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level.    The other variables, the price of skipjack (P) and the average cost (α ), are 
both statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  In the second specification for 
proposition 2, on the other hand, the estimated coefficients for the number of harvesters (n) 
and the expected number of harvesters (n
e) are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
confidence level, respectively.  The price of skipjack (P) and the average cost (α ) are also 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  The discount rate (δ ) have the expected 
signs in both equations, but they are not statistically significant.  The adjusted R
2s in both 
specifications are 0.9032 and 0.9014, respectively and the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics are 
1.9094 and 1.9158, respectively. 
  To summarize, the econometric model based on two equilibrium equations is 
estimated by equation-by-equation OLS estimation.  The estimation is also used for the 
alternative specification for proposition 1 and proposition 2 that is adding the expected 
harvester's term (n
e).  The parameter estimates on current number of harvesters (n) and 
expected harvesters (n) have unexpected signs in the individual equation.  This is because 
the data of individual harvest of skipjack is not available.  Note that they are generated by 
dividing the total revenue by the price of the skipjack.    Hence, the result may not be reliable 
very much.    In the first-period profit equation, on the other hand, the parameter estimates on 
current number of harvesters (n) and expected number of harvesters (n
e) have expected signs 
and are statistically significant.  All other parameter estimates have also expected signs and 
statistically significant ,except that the parameter estimates on discount rate is not significant.   
These results of the perfect expected signs for the equilibrium profit equation support the predictions in propositions 1 and 2, although the results for the individual harvest equation do 
not support the propositions. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
  This paper utilizes the dynamic Cournot oligopoly model of Negri (1990) and 
analyzes the effect of the current and future number of harvesters on individual equilibrium 
harvest level and equilibrium resource rents.  The model allows us to test two hypotheses.  
One is that an increase in the number of harvesters in a common property resource fishery 
reduces both the equilibrium harvest level and the resource rent of each harvester.    The other 
is that an increase in the future expectation of the number of harvesters increases both two 
equilibrium levels. 
  The hypotheses are tested by using data from the Japanese skipjack pole and line 
fishery, which harvested the skipjack stock from the Western-central Pacific Ocean between 
1972 and 1998.  The empirical results show that the parameter estimates for the current and 
future number of harvesters are of the predicted sign in equilibrium resource rent equation, 
and they are all statistically significant.    That is, the empirical results provide some evidence 
that the Japanese skipjack harvesters operated the common property resource fishery by 
responding to the current and future number of harvesters in the WCPO. 
  While the above empirical results are consistent with the dynamic Cournot game 
theory, some caution should be used in interpreting the empirical results.    The estimations in 
this study are based on many proxy data, so the results may not be very reliable.  Also, the 
data used in this study are average sample data from the Japanese skipjack pole and line 
fishery only, which is not the purse seine fishery in the WCPO.  Moreover, direct 
measurement of skipjack stock in the WCPO is not available.    To obtain more reliable results, 




Proof of Proposition 1: 
  For simplicity, we first let: 












































 ΘΘ . (A2) 
  Consider first the partial derivative of Θ with respect to a parameter n (the number of 

















  Then, by using (A3), we can show the sign of the partial derivative of the individual 
















































































since the terms in the brackets are positive (n ≥ 1). 
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< . (A6) 
Hence, by (A4) and (A6), the proposition 1 holds. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
  Taking the partial derivative of the individual equilibrium harvest in equation (10) 
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 Table 1.    Total number of purse seine vessels in the Western-central Pacific Ocean by country, 1969-1999. 
 
Year Japan  United 
State 














Vanuatu  Australia  Indonesia Spain  Kiribati Mexico  Total 
1969  4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 
1970  6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 
1971  6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 
1972  7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 
1973  6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 
1974  10  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  10 
1975  12  - - - -  ...  - - - - - - - - - -  12 
1976  15  3 - - -  ...  - - - - - - - - - -  18 
1977  14  1 - - -  ...  - - - - - - - - - -  15 
1978  14  2 - - -  ...  - - - - - - - - - -  16 
1979  17  8 - - -  ...  - - - - - - - - - -  25 
1980  16  14  2 - -  ...  1 - - - - - - - - -  33 
1981  23  14  3 - -  ...  1 - - - - - - - - -  41 
1982  33  24  10  - 1  ...  1 - - - - - - - - -  69 
1983  36  62  11  3 - 7 1 - - - - - - - - -  120 
1984  33  61  12  6  3 5 1 - - - - -  ...  - - 1  122 
1985  35  40  11  7 5 5 1 5 - -  - - ... -  - 5  114 
1986  38  36  13  10  5 4 1 8 - - - - 3 - - -  118 
1987  34  35  20  13  5 3 2 5 - - - - 3 - - -  120 
1988  39  31  23  19  9 4 4 5 - -  - 3 3 -  - -  140 
1989  37  35  30  25  13  5 4 5 - -  - 1 3 -  - -  158 
1990  35  43  39  32  13  5 4 5 - -  - 8 ... -  - -  184 
1991  35  43  36  39  15  5 3 4 6 -  - 6 - -  - -  192 
1992  38  44  36  45  12  7 3 3 7 -  - 2 - -  - -  197 
1993  36  42  34  43  12  5 3 8 7 -  - 1 - -  - -  191 
1994  33  49  32  43  11  7 3 4 8 2 1 -  - - 1 -  194 
1995  31  44  30  42  13  5 3 ... 6 3 2 -  - - 1 -  180 
1996  32  40  28  42  12  6 3 ... 4 4 2 -  - - 1 -  174 
1997  35  35  27  42  12 7  4 ... 4 10 5  -  -  -  1  - 182 
1998  35  39  26  42  12 6  4 ... 3 13 5  -  -  -  1  - 186 
1999  35  36  26  42  (12)  6  4 ... 4 13 9  -  -  8  1  - 184 
 
Note:  Symbols '...' = missing data; estimates in parentheses have been carried over from previous years. 
Source: Timothy A. Lawson (1999) Tuna Fishery Yearbook 1999        
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Constant     12.870***     13.383*** 
 (0.8817)  (1.0910) 




(n) (0.1254)  (0.1297) 




(ne ) -  (0.1378) 
    
Price  of  skipjack     0.7465***    0.6417** 
(P) (0.2624)  (0.2966) 
    
Average cost  -1.7215***     - 1 . 6 0 7 5 *** 
(α )  (0.2809) (0.3199) 
    
Discount rate  -0.1002† -0.0853† 
(δ )  (0.1016) (0.1071) 
    
Fish Stock  -  - 
(S) - - 
    
Adjusted R2  0.9564 0.9556 
    
DW 1.7411  1.7138 
    
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
** Statistically significant at 5 % significance level (one-tailed test). 
*** Statistically significant at 1 % significance level (one-tailed test). 
† Unexpected sign. 
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Constant -23.409  -10.213 
 (25.730)  (28.509) 
    
Number of 
harvesters 
  - 2 . 4 8 0 6 **    -15.335** 
(n) (1.3031)  (8.5752) 
    
Expected 
harvesters 
-   13.698* 
(ne ) -  (9.4184) 
    
Price  of  skipjack     292.58***     311.95*** 
(P) (19.931)  (23.361) 
    
Average  cost     -287.36***     - 3 0 9 . 8 5 *** 
(α )  (19.008) (23.720) 
    
Discount rate  1.5443  1.7150 
(δ )  (3.2679) (3.4946) 
    
Fish Stock  -  - 
(S) - - 
    
Adjusted R2  0.9032 0.9014 
    
DW 1.9094  1.9158 
    
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at 10 % significance level (one-tailed test). 
** Statistically significant at 5 % significance level (one-tailed test). 
*** Statistically significant at 1 % significance level (one-tailed test). 
† Unexpected sign. 
  
 
 
 
 
  